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ABSTRACT
The increasing prevalence of technology, and the ease with which the public and
companies can reproduce, recombine, and reuse copyrighted works, has rendered the onceconfusing fair use doctrine a virtual uncertainty. Given limited congressional guidance, courts
have relied heavily on the secondary use’s potential effect on the market for the original work.
While this reliance is based on the valid concern of maintaining adequate creative incentives,
the enormous growth of licensing markets has resulted in an overemphasis on economic
concerns. Recent court decisions indicate that fair use now turns not on the protection of
creative incentives, but rather the preservation of a maximum revenue stream for authors. Yet
fair use, along with the copyright system, was designed for public, not private, benefit.
Excessive concern for private gain will chill the development of new technologies. Therefore,
the author concludes that when the social value of a secondary use is high, and its impact on the
market is not only de minimis, but unlikely to diminish an author’s creative aspirations, the
secondary use must be permitted for the public good.
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I.

INTRODUCTION
Fair use is an amorphous concept.1 Since its inception, courts have struggled with its

application. This struggle has weighed on the public, which has had scant guidance of how the
doctrine fits in the context of new uses and technologies.2 The advent of Internet and the
subsequent ease with which users can reproduce, recombine, and reuse copyrighted works has
consistently aggravated this confusion. As society has moved further into the digital age, the
unpredictable nature of copyright disputes has caused litigation to run rampant.3
Greater uniformity in application is, however, possible. Concededly, the fair use inquiry
is by nature somewhat imprecise, given its sensitivity to facts.4 But by viewing fair use through
the lens of copyright’s goal of intellectual enrichment, the judiciary can enhance predictability.
A utilitarian focus not only provides society with greater direction, but also alleviates the threat
of a chilling effect on the development of new technologies.5

1

When determining whether a work is a fair use, and not an infringement of copyright, “the factors to be considered
shall include – (1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is
for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
2

See, e.g., Pamela A. MacLean, Digital Copyright Act Needs Rebooting, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 20, 2006, at 13.

3

For example, Google, Inc.’s operation of Google.com has been the constant subject of dispute. Subsequent
litigation has been, in part, due to the lack of clarity in the application of the fair use doctrine. See, e.g., Perfect 10
v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (ruling that Google’s display of thumbnail images not likely
to qualify for fair use); Kevin Kelly, Scan This Book!, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 43 (discussing
Google’s digitization of library books); Robert Hof, Ganging Up on Google, BUS. WK., Apr. 24, 2006 (discussing
various legal issues confronting Google), available at
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/apr2006/tc20060424_517518.htm; Juan Perez, Google Removing
Agence France Presse from Google News, PC WORLD, Mar. 21, 2005 (discussing Google’s aggregation of news
content), available at http://www.pcworld.com/news/article/0,aid,120125,00.asp.
4

See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5680 (1976) (Conf. Rep.) (“[T]he endless variety of situations and
combinations of circumstances that can rise in particular cases precludes the formulation of exact rules in the
statute.”); Time, Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 144 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (fair use is so “entirely
equitable… and flexible as virtually to defy definition.”);WILLIAM F. PATRY, THE FAIR USE PRIVILEGE IN
COPYRIGHT LAW 413-417 (2d ed. 1995).

3

To appropriately modify the fair use doctrine, therefore, courts must place greater
weight on the utility and productive nature of the secondary use. Simultaneously, judges must
de-emphasize the use’s market effect as subservient, but essential, to ensuring the public
benefit. For example, an internet search engine’s use of thumbnail images provides a
productive, useful function, and its potential impact on the market must not become the hinge
of the fair use analysis.6 Thus, to avoid a chilling effect on the development of such
technologies, courts in the digital era should find fair use when a ruling of infringement would
suppress a useful new technology and harm to the plaintiff’s market appears de minimis.7
II.

THE BACKGROUND OF THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
A.

FAIR USE GIVES THE JUDICIARY THE FLEXIBILITY AND DISCRETION TO
ACCOMMODATE NEW TECHNOLOGIES FOR THE PUBLIC BENEFIT.

Prior to the advent of the Internet,8 Congress codified fair use as a defense to copyright
infringement claims.9 Notwithstanding the disarray of the common law, Congress intended to

5

The fear is that ambiguities in the fair use doctrine may result in judicial suppression of useful new developments,
in part due to an emphasis on the potential market effect of the secondary use. See, e.g., Perfect 10, supra note 3, at
828; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2775-76 (2005) (discussing the delicate
balance between artistic protection and technological innovation); Nancy Ramsey, The Hidden Cost of
Documentaries, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2005, § 2, at 13 (discussing the legal ramifications of an accidental use of a
“musical” cellphone ringtone in a low-budget documentary film).
6

See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003). C.f. Perfect 10, supra note 3, at 828.

7

In other words, the public benefit should excuse a use, even in the absence of transaction costs, if the social benefit
of the use outweighs the loss to the copyright owner. See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 10.1.1.1-3 (2005)
(discussing and comparing the private and public benefit approaches to fair use). For example, the public benefit
approach would, in instances, condone a schoolteacher’s use of photocopies from a chapter of a copyrighted
textbook despite the existence of a licensing market. Id., at § 10.1.1.2.
8

Notably, codification also occurred prior to the advent and significant public use of the personal computer. See,
e.g., Erik Sandberg-Diment, Past Shows the Pitfalls of Crystal Gazing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1985, § 1 (discussing the
evolution of the personal computer).
9

Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C.). See also H.R. REP. NO. 941476, at 5678 (“The judicial doctrine of fair use… would be given express statutory recognition for the first time in
section 107.”).

4

ensure that the doctrine, with origins dating to the infancy of copyright,10 remained viable
under the 1976 Act.11 Fair use was perceived as essential to “fulfill copyright’s [] purpose ‘[t]o
promote the progress of Science and useful Arts.’”12
Despite codification, fair use remained an unclear doctrine in application.13 Congress
changed little of the common law’s expansive interpretations, 14 stating that its goal was to allow
for a flexible and dynamic future in a world of changing technologies.15 Although courts had
repeatedly ruled upon the doctrine of fair use, Congress noted that no real definition of the
concept ever emerged.16 As such, the enumerated fair use factors were declared a non-exclusive

10

See, e.g., Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).

11

“[T]he courts must be free to adapt the [fair use] doctrine to particular situations on a case-by-case basis,” H.R.
REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5680 (emphasis added), as the doctrine had been raised, and recognized, continuously over the
years as a necessary defense to infringement claims. Id. at 5679. See also Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619
(No. 4,436) (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (“[I]n truth, in literature, in science, and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things, which, are strictly new and original throughout. Every book in literature, science and art, borrows…”).
12

Although it is necessary “to secure every man in the enjoyment of his copy-right, one must not put manacles
upon science.” Carey v. Kearsley, 170 Eng. Rep. 679, 681 (K.B. 1803). These sentiments were confirmed in
subsequent cases by the Court. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 575 (1994).
13

See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 555 (1985) (ruling that “[u]nder
ordinary circumstances, the author’s right to control the first public appearance of his undisseminated expression
will outweigh a claim of fair use.”). C.f. Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484
U.S. 890 (1987) (ruling that the unpublished nature of personal letters mailed to various recipients rendered fair use
inapplicable).

14

“Section 107 is intended to restate the present judicial doctrine of fair use, not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in
any way.” H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5680.
15

“The bill endorses the purpose and general scope of the judicial doctrine, but there is no disposition to freeze the
doctrine in the statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change.” Id. This rationale was based in
part on the fact that, since its origins, “the law of copyright [had] developed in response to significant changes in
technology.” Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 430 (1984).
16

H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5679.

5

list,17 granting courts the discretion to consider other factors that might have a bearing upon the
determination.18
Although such flexibility has allowed courts to accommodate novel technological uses, it
has resulted in conflicting applications of the doctrine.19 As courts can “avoid rigid application
of the copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law was
designed to foster,”20 litigants are left without a predictable indicator of what constitutes a fair
use. Technological changes, in fact, often yield judicial decisions which contravene traditional
fair use principles.21 This uncertainty plagues the public, which in instances may avoid a use,
potentially fair, simply because of the complexity of the doctrine and the fear of litigation.22
Decisions involving new technologies have, however, evidenced a common thread.
Courts have been prone to find fair use where a ruling of infringement would suppress a useful

17

“The terms ‘including’ and ‘such as’ are illustrative, not limitative.” Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553,
90 Stat. 2541 (codified as 17 U.S.C. § 101).
18

A number of courts have applied additional factors where relevant. See PATRY, supra note 4, at 415; GOLDSTEIN,
supra note 7, at § 10.2.
19

See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 420 U.S. 376 (1975) (holding that the photography of an entire article from a specialized low circulation
medical journal constituted fair use). C.f. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994)
(holding that a profit-seeking company’s photocopying for research purposes of scientific journal articles is not fair
use).
20

Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236
(1990)).
21

New technology cases have departed from the tendency to deny fair use when an entire work is copied, or to
prefer a productive use context where an author builds on the work of another. See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) (ruling that private, non-commercial taping of “free” television
programming for time-shifting purposes is fair use). But see Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,
125 S. Ct. 2764, 2764 (2005) (holding distributor of a device with the object to infringe copyright liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties using the device, regardless of the device’s lawful uses).
22

See generally WILLFUL INFRINGEMENT (Fiat Lucre LLC 2003), available at
http://willfulinfringement.com/WillfulinfringementFLM.asp (discussing the unintended consequences of extending
copyright protection). See also Ramsey, supra note 5, at 13.

6

new technology and the harm to the plaintiff’s market appears de minimis.23 This tendency is
predicated on the fact that copyright was designed for the public benefit.24 So long as creative
incentives remain sufficient, the public interest demands the allowance of a useful new
technology.25 Although this hasn’t necessarily established predictability, the mere existence of
this commonality indicates that fair use can become more predictive as courts hone their focus
on the fair use factors in light of copyright’s utilitarian objective.
B.

FAIR USE IS INTEGRAL TO COPYRIGHT LAW’S CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE OF THE
INTELLECTUAL ENRICHMENT OF THE PUBLIC.

Fair use is an integral component of copyright law.26 Courts must not apply the doctrine
grudgingly, as it is not an occasional departure from the grand conception of copyright.27
Rather, its foundation provides the necessary support to ensure that the system functions to
benefit the public.28 As such, the statutory fair use factors are “to be explored, and the results
weighed together, in light of the purposes of copyright.”29

23

See, e.g., Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 417 (1984) [hereinafter Betamax]; Williams &
Wilkins, 497 F.2d at 1345. But see American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994). Compare
with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2770-74 (2005).
24

See, e.g., Betamax, 464 U.S. at 417.

25

U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8.

26

“[Fair use] was the child of the common law that sought to accommodate a statutory scheme, the goal of which
was to ‘encourage… learned men to compose and write useful books,” by allowing a second author to use, under
certain conditions, a portion of a prior author’s work, where that second author would himself produce a work
promoting the expressed goal.” PATRY, supra note 4, at 5 (emphasis in original) (quoting 8 Anne c.19 § 1 (1710)).
If it is true, as Justice Story noted, that few, if any, works do not build upon the efforts of prior authors, Emerson,
supra note 11, it is natural to conclude that fair use is an integral component of copyright law in achieving fair use’s
utilitarian goal. See, e.g., GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 10.1.
27

Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1110 (1990) (“Fair use should not be
considered a bizarre, occasionally tolerated departure from the grand conception of the copyright monopoly.”).
28

Id. (discussing fair use as a necessary ingredient to fulfill copyright’s utilitarian objective).

29

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (emphasis added).

7

Courts, however, often allow the facts of a given case to overshadow copyright
principles. This is due, in part, to the nature of fair use, as it necessitates that courts adhere to a
case-by-case analysis.30 But more pointedly, this is due to the judiciary’s susceptibility to allow
a party’s character to become relevant to the fair use determination.31 The temptation for judges
to allow legal analysis to be shaped by the “right” outcome is understandable.32 In Hustler, for
example, the Ninth Circuit was forced to determine whether the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s
opportunistic, commercial exploitation of Hustler’s tasteless parody ad, which depicted the
Reverend as having had an incestuous sexual experience with his mother, constituted fair use.33
The majority affirmed the Reverend’s use, “even after resolving all factual issues in favor of
Hustler.”34
By focusing on the moral fiber of each party, the Ninth Circuit allowed such qualities to
overshadow the actual concern for public gain.35 The dissent noted this, stating that the
majority cursorily declared the Reverend’s “responsive” use fair partially because of the

30

See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 560 (stating that the fair use analysis is not to be simplified with bright-line
rules, as the doctrine calls for a case-by-case analysis); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 65 (“[S]ince the doctrine is an
equitable rule of reason, no generally applicable definition is possible, and each case must be decided on its own
facts.”).
31

For example, many courts have singled out advertising as quintessentially commercial and therefore not favored
as fair use, GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 10.2.2.1(a), but advertisements may represent a particularly effective
means for informing the public of important facts. Id. See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Moral Majority, Inc., 796
F.2d 1148, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the Reverend Jerry Falwell’s fair advertising use of Hustler’s
original parody ad which made several inflammatory comments targeting the Reverend).
32

“In all areas of law, judges are tempted to rely on findings of good or bad faith to justify a decision. Such
reasoning permits us to avoid rewarding morally questionable conduct.” Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1126.
33

Hustler, 796 F.2d at 1149-50.

34

Id. at 1156.

35

Id. at 1157-58 (Poole, J., dissenting). To be sure, the personal attack is relevant to the fair use analysis, but
Falwell went beyond the public’s interest in defense through criticism and commentary, id., and “actively sought to
exploit the emotional impact of the work to raise money. Id.

8

Reverend’s need for self-defense against Hustler’s derogatory personal attack.36 Devoid from
the majority’s analysis was any plausible explanation as to how the Reverend’s “defensive”
statement about pornography was not merely calculated to exploit Hustler’s acts,37 given the
admission that the ad was part of a “market approach” to fund raising.38 When one considers
that the proper bounds of fair use are the benefits to the public, it becomes clear that a party’s
status or intentions are largely irrelevant to, and misplaced in, the context of the fair use
analysis.39
While it is true that Congress mandates the consideration of a use’s nature, such as its
denomination as nonprofit or commercial,40 this consideration must be judicially limited,41 and
qualified to reflect copyright’s goal of public enrichment.42 Reliance on faith “[not only]
produces anomalies that conflict with the goals of copyright[, but] adds to the confusion
surrounding the doctrine.”43 For example, in Texaco, Dr. Chickering, a scientist at a Texaco
research center, photocopied eight articles out of a scientific journal purchased by Texaco to use

36

Id.

37

Id. at 1152 (majority opinion).

38

Id.

39

See, e.g., Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1128 (stating that fair use depends on factors pertinent to the objective of
copyright law, and not on the morality or motives of the parties); Reed v. Holliday, 19 F. 325 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1884).
40

17 U.S.C. § 107(1).

41

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 10.2.2.1(a) (“On principle, it is far from clear that the commercial-noncommercial
distinction should receive any weight at all, except perhaps as a covert subsidy to worthy nonprofit enterprises such
as schools and universities.”).

42

If commerciality carried significant force against a finding of fair use, the commercial distinction “would
swallow nearly all of the illustrative uses listed in the preamble paragraph of § 107.” Campbell, 510 U.S. at 519.

43

Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1126.

9

in his research.44 In declining to find fair use, the Second Circuit’s rationale rested, in part, on
the fact that Texaco, as a large commercial enterprise, could afford to purchase additional copies
of scientific journal articles.45 This commercial-noncommercial distinction “has little direct
bearing on either the benefits or the losses produced by a defendant’s use.”46 The fact that an
individual scientist, rather than a large corporation, is engaging in copying for scientific
research, does not yield any insight into, nor alter, the public’s potential benefit from the use.47
Fair use must, therefore, focus on whether the secondary use is of the type that the doctrine was
created to protect.
Ensuring that fair use reflects utilitarian principles is a natural conclusion when one
considers the concept of copyright. The immediate effect of the copyright grant is to assure the
author a fair return.48 But this limited grant “is intended to motivate the creative activity of
authors and inventors..., allow[ing] the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired.”49 The inference to be drawn is that “in the
absence of [] public benefit, the grant of a copyright monopoly to individuals would be

44

American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 915 (2d Cir. 1994).

45

Id. at 931 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). This conclusion is reinforced by the court’s statement that had the scientist
whose photocopying practices were called into question not been in an institutional environment, the character of his
purpose would militate in favor of finding fair use. Id. at 935. C.f. id. at 920 n.6 (majority opinion).

46

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 10.2.2.1(a).

47

Texaco, 60 F.3d at 936 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).

48

Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).

49

Betamax, 464 U.S. at 417 (emphasis added).

10

unjustified.”50 Thus, “[t]he monopoly created by copyright [] rewards the individual author in
order to benefit the public.”51
This functional basis of copyright coincides with the trend in decisions involving new
technologies of finding fair use where market harm is de minimis and the new technology
useful.52 As we proceed into the digital age, the doctrine of fair use should become broader,
accommodating new technologies for the public benefit, rather than more narrow.53 Except
when necessary to ensure the public benefit, public policy weighs against permitting private
economic monopolies.54 In order to ensure that, as technology evolves, courts view fair use
through the “constitutional” lens, and subsequent rulings conform to this trend, it is necessary
to reexamine the fair use factors in light of the aforementioned principles.
There are four statutory factors: (1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the nature
of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used; and (4) the
market effect of the potential use.55 Although each directs attention to a different facet of the
problem, 56 there is substantial overlap between them.57 The factors do not represent a

50

1 M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §1.03[A] (2005). See also Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156;
Betamax, 464 U.S. at 417.
51

Betamax, 464 U.S. at 477 (emphasis added).

52

See supra text accompanying note 7.

53

See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2776 n.8 (2005) (“[W]idespread
distribution of creative works through improved technologies may enable the synthesis of new works or generate
audiences for emerging artists.”).
54

1 NIMMER, supra note 50, at § 1.03[A]. Thus, assuming the “insignificant” weight of the second and third
factors, detriment to the market must outweigh the utility and productiveness of the secondary use in order for a
court to reject a fair use defense. This is not to say that a plaintiff carries the burden of proof, but merely to
demonstrate that copyright’s ultimate goal is to reward the public, rather than the plaintiff.
55

17 U.S.C. § 107.

56

Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1110.
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scorecard;58 the relative weight each is assigned will depend on the court and the case.59 Given
this flexibility and “boundlessness,” it is critical that courts ensure that each factor is qualified to
reflect copyright’s utilitarian goal, and the factors are weighted in order to guarantee the
minimum creative incentives necessary to maximize public benefit.
III.

TO MAXIMIZE PUBLIC BENEFIT, THE FIRST FACTOR MUST HIGHLIGHT THE PRODUCTIVE
PURPOSE AND UTILITY OF THE SECONDARY USE, AND DOWNPLAY INCIDENTAL
COMMERCIALISM.
The first factor requires courts to explore “the purpose and character of the use,

including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.”60
In analyzing this factor, courts generally focused on two aspects of the secondary use:
productivity and commerciality.61 After Campbell, confusion arose as to whether “productivity”
was a proper label under this analysis;62 the Campbell Court used the term “transformative” in
analyzing whether the new work merely supplanted the objects of the original.63 The result was
a judicial shift in focus a use’s productivity to its degree of transformation.64

57

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 10.2.2.1.

58

Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1110.

59

GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 10.2.2.

60

17 U.S.C. § 107(1).

61

See, e.g., Betamax 464 U.S. at 417 n.40; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-79; 4 NIMMER, supra note 50, at
13.05[A][1][b]-[c].
62

See, e.g., 4 NIMMER, supra note 50, at 13.05[A][1][b] (discussing the effects of the Campbell Court’s use of the
“transformative” moniker).
63

For the precise language used in Campbell, see 510 U.S. at 579.

64

A survey of decisions indicates that the majority of courts focus primarily on the transformative nature of the
secondary work, rather than its productive purpose. See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922; Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818; Buena
Vista Home Entm’t, Inc. v. Video Pipeline, Inc., 342 F.3d 191, 198 (3rd Cir. 2003); Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F.
Supp. 2d 828, 847 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

12

While the transformative inquiry is relevant to a use’s purpose, the subsequent neglect
of productivity was not only unintended by the Campbell Court, but also frustrates copyright’s
utilitarian aim. Campbell was concerned with the parody of a song.65 As such, reliance on the
term “transformative” made sense; such a moniker more properly suits works that seek more
directly to comment, rather than build, upon the past.66 If the term “productive” had been
retained in parody context, it would have been more difficult for courts to justify comment and
criticism as fair use.67 Further, although the Campbell Court stated that the central purpose of
their inquiry was to see whether the new work merely superseded the objects of the original
creation,68 this statement was in reference to uses such as “criticism, or comment, or news
reporting, and the like.”69 Thus, it is quite plausible that the Court desired the transformative
aspect to dominate the first factor inquiry only in the stated contexts.
In any event, strict reliance on a transformative inquiry misses the utilitarian focus of
copyright. While it is true that “the goal of copyright is generally furthered by the creation of
transformative [uses,]”70 and transformative uses are generally productive,71 it does not follow

65

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 571.

66

To be sure, parodies must utilize the past in order to “conjure up” the original work. Id. at 588. But parodies are
deserving of substantial freedom not because of their productivity in promoting the progress of science and the
useful arts; rather, it is because they serve as a vehicle for social and literary criticism. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at
§ 10.2.1.2.
67

See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 806 (9th Cir. 2003) (ruling defendant’s
photography depicting Barbie dolls in absurd and sexualized positions was fair use designed to comment on social
norms); Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 137 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1998) (ruling defendant’s advertisement
superimposing actor’s face on plaintiff’s well-known photograph of a nude, pregnant actress constituted parody).
Such uses are more difficult to justify in terms of “productive” purpose, as opposed to “transformative” purpose.
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

69

Id. at 579-80 (emphasis added). Interestingly, the Court omitted the uses in the preamble that seem to conflict
with the “transformative” moniker, namely “teaching [], scholarship, [and] research.” 17 U.S.C. § 107.

70

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
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that productive uses are generally transformative.72 Productive uses are, however, by their
nature, at the very heart of copyright’s utilitarian goal.73 Although the Campbell Court noted
that transformation use is not necessary for fair use,74 and commentators have stated that
“[w]hatever the label,… productive use is… of crucial importance to the fair use analysis,”75 the
transformative moniker has nonetheless had a negative impact on the fair use doctrine’s
predictability and its role in copyright’s mandate to benefit the public.76
The Second Circuit’s decision in Texaco provides an example of how the transformative
label can cause courts to overlook the productive nature of a use. In Texaco, Dr. Chickering did
not immediately use the articles that he had photocopied for scientific research, but placed them
in his files to have available for future reference.77 In ruling on the first factor, the court
emphasized the fact that “the secondary use involve[d] merely an untransformed duplication,

71

Courts have rightfully assumed that there is an inherent and productive social value in a parody’s ability to shed
light on an original work through comment and criticism. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. See generally Betamax, 464
U.S. at 478-80 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72

See, e.g., Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770; Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922-24. C.f. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 448.
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Betamax, 464 U.S. at 478. It should be noted that “productive” is defined here in terms of a secondary work’s
social utility and potential use in facilitating new developments. Id. at 456 n.40. C.f. supra text accompanying note
71.
74

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579. Additionally, the Campbell Court stated that the more transformative the new work,
the less the significance of other factors such as commercialism, id., further inviting lower courts to overemphasize
the transformative inquiry.
75

See, e.g., 4 NIMMER, supra note 50, at § 13.05[A][1][b].

76

See, e.g., Ty, Inc. v. Publ’ns Int’l, Ltd., 81 F. Supp. 2d 899, 905 (N.D. Ill. 2000), rev’d 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir.
2002); Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1401 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 521 U.S.
1146 (1997); Texaco, 60 F.3d at 922-24; Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 847-49 (C.D. Cal. 2006);
Columbia Pictures Enters., L.P. v. Miramax Films Corp., 11 F. Supp. 2d 1179, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 1998).
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Texaco, 60 F.3d at 915.

14

[and as such] the value generated… [was] little… more than the value that inhere[d] in the
original.”78
This neglects the productive nature of the use. As the dissent noted, the photocopying
of journal articles as part of ongoing scientific research fits squarely within the scope of the
illustrative fair uses in § 107.79 These articles were duplicated “to assist the memory, curiosity
and ongoing inquiries of a single researcher.”80 While it may be true that a photocopy is an
untransformed duplication,81 it is a step in the process of taking and keeping notes, which are
“important raw material[s] in the synthesis of new ideas.”82 Because this step “ordinarily
entail[s] no transformation of the material,”83 the Second Circuit gave insufficient weight to Dr.
Chickering’s productive purpose.
A.

IN THE CONTEXT OF NEW TECHNOLOGIES, THE TRANSFORMATIVE MONIKER
CONFLICTS WITH COPYRIGHT’S UTILITARIAN GOAL.

The transformative label has an even greater negative impact in the context of new
technologies. Copyright law “leans in favor of protecting technology.”84 Yet a transformative
focus discourages fresh developments. Because new technologies are designed to “disseminate
information and ideas more broadly or more efficiently,”85 they often “entail no transformation

78

Id. at 923.

79

Id. at 933 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (“[T]he fair use of a copyrighted work… for purposes
such as… teaching…, scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.”).
80

Texaco, 60 F.3d at 933 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).

81

Id. at 923 (majority opinion).

82

Id. at 935 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).

83

Id.

84

Grokster, 125 U.S. at 2793 (Breyer, J., concurring).
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of [] material.”86 Thus, although transformation is not needed for fair use,87 its absence
consistently weighs against a useful technology’s primary justification against the copyright
owner’s interests.88
The Court for the Central District of California’s recent decision in Perfect 10 provides an
example of how the nature of a new technology is often in juxtaposition with the requirement of
a transformative use. In Perfect 10, Google used thumbnails of images owned by Perfect 10, an
adult magazine, in order to present the results of queries to its “image” search engine.89 Perfect
10 sought injunctive relief to prohibit Google from using any thumbnail of a Perfect 10 image in
the operation of its search engine.90
In granting a preliminary injunction, the court discussed the transformative issue.91
It noted the value that search engines provide to the public, stating that “Google’s use of
thumbnails to simplify and expedite access to information [was] transformative of P10’s use of
reduced-size images to entertain.”92 Yet the court went on to rule that Google’s use was

85

Id. at 2791.

86

Texaco, 60 F.3d at 935 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). For example, “VCRs, typewriters, tape recorders, photocopiers,
computers, cassette players, compact disc burners, digital video recorders, MP3 players, Internet search engines, and
peer-to-peer software,” Grokster, 125 U.S. at 2792 (Breyer, J., concurring), all aid in the flow of information, but
provide minimal to no transformation, at least in a literal sense, of the original work.
87

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.

88

See, e.g., Leval, 103 HARV. L. REV. at 1110-11 (stating that the secondary user’s claim of fair use turns primarily
on the user’s justification of the purpose and character of the secondary use). Although the other factors are relevant
to determine the applicability of fair use, those factors, unlike the first one, are concerned “with protecting the
incentives of authorship.” Id. at 1116.
89

Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 833-34 (C.D. Cal. 2006).

90

Id. at 834-35.
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Id. at 847-49.

92

Id. at 849 (emphasis added).
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consumptive.93 The court stated that as Perfect 10 had entered the market for sale of thumbnail
images to cell phones, Google’s use was consumptive in the sense that it superseded Perfect 10’s
use of reduced-sized images.94
Although the court considered the utility of internet search engines, it failed to give
productivity significant weight. The mere existence of a similar use by Perfect 10 rendered
Google’s use consumptive. Thus, although Google’s purpose in displaying thumbnail images
was wholly different than Perfect 10’s, Google’s purpose became largely immaterial because of
the existence of a “market” for such images in a separate medium. This seems inconsistent with
Sony’s assurance that copyright laws are not intended to discourage or control the emergence of
new technologies.95
Focusing on the productive nature and utility of a new technology avoids such a
conflict. It is indisputable that Google’s image search engine serves a productive, useful
purpose. “[G]iven the exponentially increasing amounts of data on the web, search engines
have become essential sources of vital information for individuals, governments, non-profits,
and businesses who seek to locate information.”96 As such, this aspect of the fair use factor
should, as in the case of many productive technologies designed to aid in the dissemination of
information, weigh in Google’s favor.97 An emphasis on the productive and useful nature of
technologies such as Google’s fits more closely with copyright’s utilitarian goal.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2791 (Breyer, J., concurring).

96

Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849.
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B.

DUE TO THE NATURE OF TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS, THE TRANSFORMATIVE
LABEL CAUSES COURTS TO CONFLATE THE FIRST AND FOURTH FACTORS.

The transformative requirement causes courts to not only neglect productivity, but to
also improperly consider a use’s market effect under the first factor.98 As stated before, the
transformative analysis has been framed as “whether the new work merely ‘supersede[s] the
objects’ of the original creation, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or
different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”99 Courts have
interpreted this as requiring consideration of a use’s intended and “incidental” purposes.100 The
phrase “incidental” purpose is more aptly labeled “incidental” effect. However, for an
“incidental” effect to be properly considered under the first factor, it must be expressed in terms
of purpose, as that is the aim of the first factor.101 An analysis of a use’s “incidental” purpose
ultimately leads courts to consider that use’s economic impact.
The problem with allowing the economic impact of the secondary use to become
relevant to a determination of its purpose is that such an analysis conflates the first and fourth
factors. Effectively, a potential negative effect on the market for the original work will be
counted against a defendant twice; once under a court’s analysis of the secondary use’s
purpose, and once under that use’s effect on the market. If a secondary use can be visualized in
97

This is not to say that Google’s encroachment on Perfect 10’s thumbnail image market is irrelevant, but the focus
under the first factor is the “purpose and character of the use.”
98

Potential market effect on or decrease in the value of the original work is properly considered under the fourth
factor. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
99

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (alteration in original).

100

See, e.g., Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849; Texaco, 60 F.3d at 33-41. C.f. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 811 (9th Cir.
2003).
101

17 U.S.C. § 101(1).
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any manner as indirectly competing with the market for the original work, this effect is counted
against the secondary use’s purpose, as the use “supersede[s] the objects[] of the original.”102
This is true despite the fact that this purpose may be closely in tune with copyright’s utilitarian
aim.
The transformative label raises this precise dilemma in the digital era, where new
technologies are often designed to aid in the flow of information, but have little transformative
“value.” There is always the threat that such technologies may be utilized in a manner so as to
“supplant the original [work].”103 Thus, despite that the purpose of such technologies is closely
aligned with copyright’s utilitarian goal, the same is viewed as weighing against fair use. For
example, in Perfect 10, the court found that the search engine’s purpose weighed against Google,
as “Google’s use of thumbnails supersede[d] this use of P10’s images,[sic] because mobile users
can download and save the thumbnails displayed by Google Image Search onto their
phones.”104 But simply because the copyright holder develops a way to exact an additional
price should not alter the search engine’s purpose under the first factor; the advent of this new
market bears upon the distinct question raised by the fourth factor.105 The right to expand ways
to charge for new copies of an original work must be limited to those expansions necessary to

102

Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348. This is not to say that this indirect competition is irrelevant. To the contrary, it is
highly relevant under the market analysis mandated by the fourth factor.
103

Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 562.

104

Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849. Similarly, in Texaco, the court found that the transformative use factor
weighed against Texaco because, to the extent that photocopying for research was transformative prior to licensing,
the birth of that market rendered this use as superseding the original, and as such, non-transformative. Texaco, 60
F.3d at 924.
105

See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 934 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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maintain adequate incentives for authorship of the original work.106 In this instance, it can hardly
be said that Perfect 10’s expansion into the cell phone thumbnail image market was necessary
for it to maintain ample revenue to continue the photography and sale of pornographic images.
While it is true that the four statutory factors are not to be treated in isolation from one
another,107 it was not the Court’s intent to have the secondary use’s effect on the market carry
weight under the first factor.108 This factor’s end in the fair use inquiry is to establish the
purpose of the secondary use; degree of transformation is merely one possible aid in making
this determination.109 Eliminating the transformative label, and focusing on the productive
purpose and utility of the secondary use, would alleviate this conflation of factors. For
example, in Kelly, another case involving the use of thumbnail images by an internet search
engine, the Ninth Circuit found that the first factor weighed in favor of Arriba, the creator of the
search engine, because Arriba “[had] created a different purpose for the images.”110 By
emphasizing utility and the public benefit, the Kelly Court avoided allowing the search engine’s
“incidental” purpose to become relevant to the first factor analysis.111 Note that this previously
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See, e.g., U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8; Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2775; Betamax, 464 U.S. at 442; Leval, 103
HARV. L. REV. at 1110.
107

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578.
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In analyzing the transformative issue, the Campbell Court used the oft-quoted language of Justice Story; namely,
whether the work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original. Id. at 579. Justice Story originally used this
language in the market effect context. Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348 (“[L]ook to… the degree in which the use may
prejudice the sale, or diminish the profits, or supersede the objects, of the original work.”).
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Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578. See also 17 § 107(1).
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Kelly, supra note 6, 336 F.3d at 820.
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Kelly, 336 F.3d at 819. Admittedly, the court did note that Arriba’s use did not supersede plaintiff’s because
enlarging thumbnail images would sacrifice clarity, thus indirectly noting that the secondary use did not affect
plaintiff’s market. Id. However, the court repeatedly emphasized that Arriba’s success under the first factor was
because it had created a new purpose for plaintiff’s images. Id. at 819-20. And in any event, the court’s focus on
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mentioned shift in judicial focus does not foreclose the possibility that the first factor might
weigh against a new technology. In cases where a technology appears designed primarily to
facilitate infringement, but may be utilized to aid in the flow of information, the purpose may
weigh against such a use.112
C.

THE COMMERCIAL NATURE OF A DEFENDANT’S SECONDARY USE MUST BE
DE-EMPHASIZED TO RETAIN FOCUS ON THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

An emphasis on productive purpose and utility does not fully purge the problematic
nature of the first factor. The first factor also requires courts to consider the commercial nature
of the secondary use.113 The rationale for this requirement is twofold: (1) an infringing use
designed primarily for private commercial gain does not further the public interest;114 and (2)
complete neglect of a defendant’s gain interferes with copyright’s management of balancing
artistic protection against public benefit.115 If works can be readily exploited by third parties to

generate a profit with no acknowledgement to the author, creative incentives may be
diminished.116

the public benefit of Arriba’s purpose should not change simply because plaintiff discovers a new way to exact an
additional price; this fact should be considered solely under the fourth factor.
112

See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1015 (ruling that peer-to-peer that stored MP3s in
server-side “library” was utilized primarily for copyright infringement); Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2776-78 (ruling that
peer-to-peer software with no centralized servers was utilized primarily for copyright infringement). Such
conclusions, however, will require a case-by-case analysis. Betamax, 464 U.S. at 447-456 (ruling that home
videotape recorders were capable of substantial non-infringing uses).
113

17 U.S.C. § 107(1). See also Betamax, 464 U.S. at 451; Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578-85.
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4 NIMMER, supra note 50, at 13.05[A][1][c]. See also GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, at § 10.2.2.1(a) (“The
commercial-noncommercial distinction, though it makes little sense when it divides profit-seeking and nonprofit
activities, enjoys considerably more justification when it divides between public and private uses of copyrighted
works…”).
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See, e.g., Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2775.
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See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 940-41 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (discussing the tradeoff between creative incentives
and public benefit).
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The difficulty arises in the context of “intermediate” uses, where “commercial
‘exploitation’ is indirect or derivative.”117 The Court has stated that although a commercial
purpose tends to weigh against fair use, “the force of that tendency will vary with the
context.”118 Given this ambiguity, courts often struggle in determining what degree of
attenuation sufficiently eliminates the taint of commerciality.119 In the digital age, confusion has
been aggravated by new forms of advertising, such as banner ads and “clickthrough”
schemes.120 For example, in Perfect 10 the court found Google’s purpose highly commercial
because of its AdSense program, which “allows third party websites ‘to carry Google-sponsored
advertising and share revenue’ that flows from the advertising displays and click-throughs.”121
The court reasoned that Google’s AdSense partners that contain infringing copies of Perfect 10’s
photographs “directly benefit Google’s bottom line.”122 Google contended that “its AdSense
Program Policies prohibit a website from registering as an AdSense partner if the site’s
webpages contain images that appear in Google Image Search results.”123 The court rejected this
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Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522-23 (9th Cir. 1992). See also Texaco, 60 F.3d at 921
(characterizing Texaco’s photocopying as an “intermediate” use).
118

Campbell, 510 U.S. at 585. See also Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 309 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 365
(1992) (“Whether the profit element of the fair use calculus affects the ultimate determination of whether there is a
fair use depends on the totality of the factors considered; it is not controlling.”).
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See, e.g., PATRY, supra note 4, at 423-24 (discussing the mixed results that intermediate uses have led to).
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In the “banner advertising” scheme, the advertiser simply pays a flat rate for ad space on a website. JOHN
BATTELLE, THE SEARCH 166 (Portfolio 2005). By contrast, clickthrough, or performance-based, advertising is when
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See also David Vise, Think Again: Google, FOREIGN POLICY, May/Jun. 2006, at 22; Carolyn O’Hara, In Google We
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Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846. C.f. Kelly, 336 F.3d at 818.
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Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
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Id. at 846.
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argument as Google failed to adduce evidence of enforcement of its policy.124 Had Google
demonstrated enforcement, there is a strong possibility the court would’ve found that the first
factor, and the fair use analysis, weighed in Google’s favor, as Google’s publicly beneficial
purpose would not have been clouded in the slightest by private gain from infringement.
In any event, the problem with the court’s analysis is that it neglects that copyright’s
chief aim is “to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”125 Understandably, it is
difficult for courts to determine what degree of emphasis should be placed on incidental
commercial gains, as even the scholar “hopes to earn a living through his scholarship.”126 But
assuming the utility and public benefit of a secondary use, a defendant’s indirect commercial
purpose is only relevant insomuch as it may reduce the original creator’s incentives for
authorship.127 In the absence of a detrimental impact on creative incentives,128 a defendant’s
commercial gain should not carry significant, if any, weight.129
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Id. at 846-47.
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Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156.
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4 NIMMER, supra note 50, at § 13.05[A][1][a].
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See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 939-40 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (“[S]o long as the copyright system assures sufficient
revenue to print and distribute scientific journals, the level of copyright revenue is not among the incentives that
drive the authors to the creative acts that the copyright laws are intended to foster.”).
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Note that a non-commercial purpose can nonetheless have a devastating impact on the market. See, e.g.,
Grokster, 125 S.Ct. at 2770-73 (discussing market effect of non-commercial peer-to-peer networks). Courts can
take this into account under the first factor if a defendant’s purpose is to foster infringement, Id. at 2780, as the fair
use doctrine is an equitable rule of reason. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 5679. In the absence of such evidence, a
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As long as copyright protection assures sufficient revenue to maintain creative incentives from the author’s
perspective, a defendant’s commercial gain is largely irrelevant; “[n]owhere in the case law is there support for the
proposition that the monopoly granted by copyright is designed to ensure the holder a maximum economic return.”
Texaco, 60 F.3d at 941 (Jacobs, J., dissenting) (citing Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1023, 1029 (1994)).
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In characterizing Google’s use of Perfect 10’s thumbnail images as commercial, the court
in Perfect 10 entirely failed to mention whether such a use would diminish Perfect 10’s
incentives to create its high-quality, nude photographs of “natural” models.130 Indeed, the court
summarily concluded that as Google benefited commercially from potential infringement of
Perfect 10’s images, its use was highly commercial.131 This conclusion erroneously presumes
that the discouragement of infringement is the primary goal of copyright; the goal of copyright
protection is to stimulate artistic creativity.132 Had the court framed the inquiry in terms of
whether Google’s “commercial” purpose reduced Perfect 10’s creative incentives for production
of its photography, its conclusions would have been more informed by the utilitarian nature of
copyright.133
This is not to say that, under this analysis, Perfect 10 could not have demonstrated that
Google’s purpose was privately commercial rather than publicly beneficial. For example, if
Google had altered the ranks of its primary search results in a manner such that the results were
not sorted by relevance,134 but by sponsorship, Google’s purpose would no longer be the pure
facilitation of useful information. Rather, Google’s purpose would be to provide the user with

130

Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 846-47.
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Id. at 847. This is not to say that there is not a correlation between the commercial nature of a defendant’s use
and a potential reduction in creative incentives. But the court neglected to mention that Google’s use would yield
such a result, indicating the court’s rationale was largely based on ensuring Perfect 10 a maximum economic return.
See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 941 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
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creativity.”); Aiken, 422 U.S. at 156; Betamax, 464 U.S. at 477; 1 NIMMER, supra note 50, at §1.03[A].
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See, e.g., Texaco, 60 F.3d at 939-41 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). C.f. Id. at 921-22 (majority opinion).
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See, e.g., BATTELLE, supra note 120, at 157-59.
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the most relevant “sponsor” sites. This would not only limit the results from a query,
potentially without the user’s knowledge, but would also filter out information and additional
viewpoints that may be highly relevant to a user’s request.135 Effectively, such a search
algorithm would frustrate, not further, copyright’s purpose to enhance public welfare. It is
undeniable that, in such a scenario, Perfect 10 could readily color Google’s purpose and use as
for private gain, weighing against fair use, rather than for public benefit.
IV.

ALTHOUGH THE SECOND FACTOR HAS BEEN PROPERLY APPLIED IN THE CONTEXT OF
NEW DEVELOPMENTS, COURTS MUST CONTINUE TO ENSURE THAT CREATIVE ELEMENTS
ARE NOT OVERSHADOWED BY THE POTENTIAL FUNCTIONAL USES OF A WORK.
The second fair use factor requires courts to examine “the nature of the copyrighted

work.”136 Although the legislative history and case law dealing with this factor are sparse,137
particularly with respect to new technologies,138 it is accepted that “[w]orks that are creative in
nature are closer to the core of intended copyright protection than are more fact-based
works.”139 Copyright protects expression, not facts.140 The rationale is that informational works
more readily lend themselves to productive use by others than creative works of
entertainment.141 Therefore, “the more creative a work, the more protection it should be
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See, e.g., Jacob Weisberg, Breaking China, SLATE, Feb. 22, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2136777 (discussing
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at 1116.
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accorded from copying; correlatively, the more informational or functional the plaintiff’s work,
the broader should be the scope of the fair use defense.”142
There is a danger, however, in allowing perceived potential uses of a work to become
relevant to a determination of its nature.143 “[E]nforcement of rights in factual works poses a
greater risk of inhibiting the free flow of information than does the enforcement of rights in
fictional entertainments.”144 Condemning a work as functional may require a court to pass
judgment on the particular “value” of an artistic representation.145 For example, in Perfect 10,
Google argued that Perfect 10’s photos were more functional, rather than creative, because they
were likely utilized for sexual gratification.146 The Perfect 10 court correctly rejected this
argument, stating that “[p]hotographs that are meant to be viewed by the public for informative
and aesthetic purposes… are generally creative in nature.”147 By avoiding passing judgment on
the social value of a work generally accepted as creative,148 the court’s conclusion that the
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second factor weighed in favor of Perfect 10 properly reflected the notion that “[c]opyright is
not a privilege reserved for the well-behaved.”149
Courts must not allow, as Google had argued for, potential functional uses of a work to
overshadow creative elements. This risk is particularly acute in the context of new technologies,
which are often characterized as “informational” works for purposes of the second factor.150
Such a characterization may cause courts to pass judgment on the creative value of such
works.151 As such, although this factor has been applied rather uniformly, the judiciary must
continue to give deference to creative elements of a work without passing judgment on their
“value,” thereby ensuring that the second factor properly concerns itself with protecting the
incentives of authorship.152
V.

UNDER THE THIRD FACTOR, THE AMOUNT AND SUBSTANTIALITY OF THE TAKING MUST
BE REASONABLE IN RELATION TO THE PURPORTED JUSTIFICATION.
The third factor directs courts to examine “the amount and substantiality of the portion

used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole.”153 Although wholesale copying militates
against a finding of fair use,154 “[t]he extent of permissible copying varies with the purpose and
character of the use.”155 Thus, the primary concern is whether the taking is reasonable in
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relation to purported justification of the secondary use;156 “excessive copying not commensurate
with the purpose of the use loses the privilege of fair use.”157
In Perfect 10, Perfect 10 argued that Google’s use of thumbnails was a greater taking than
necessary to achieve the objective of providing effective image search capabilities.158
Specifically, Perfect 10 argued that “Google could have provided such assistance through the
use of text.”159 In concluding the third factor weighed neither for or against either party, the
court rejected the argument that Google could provide an effective search engine in another
manner, stating that a substitute such as text would reduce the usefulness of the visual search
engine.160
This approach correctly reflects that the amount and substantiality of a taking must be
commensurate with a use’s purpose. Google’s search engine, as is the case with many
technological developments, is designed to simplify and expedite access to information.161 In
order to present the information to the user in a useful format, Google required the use of
“whole” thumbnail images.162 An individual utilizing an image search engine presumably
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desires to see a visual description of her targeted query; words describing a model or a
physically-altered image of a model, either through color alterations, portion removals, or
interference, are not efficient, workable substitutes.163 People already have inherent difficulties
in realizing physical descriptions.164 And as Justice Stewart famously stated in his concurrence
in Jacobellis,165 it may be impossible to create an intelligible shorthand description of hardcore
pornography, but one knows such pornography when she sees it.166 As such, Google’s use of
“whole” thumbnail images was reasonable in relation to its justification of the expedition of
information for the public benefit.
VI.

COURTS MUST NOT VIEW THE FOURTH FACTOR AS THE MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF
FAIR USE.
The fourth factor is listed as requiring courts to consider “the effect of the use upon the

potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.”167 Originally, this factor was
characterized as “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair use.”168 Accentuation
of the market factor is understandable, as “[a] secondary use that interferes excessively with an
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author’s incentives subverts the aim of copyright.”169 However, “[i]n an era when licensing and
subsidiary rights have taken on increasing importance,”170 courts must ensure that a particular
potential market is in fact an incentive stimulating an author’s creation.171 As such, although
licensing is often an important part of the copyright owner’s market,172 courts must be wary not
to overstate the importance of the market factor, as it exists only to serve copyright’s utilitarian
aim.173
A.

ALTHOUGH THE FOURTH FACTOR STRIKES THE BALANCE BETWEEN THE PUBLIC
BENEFIT AND THE AUTHOR’S INCENTIVES FOR CREATION, IT IS SUBSERVIENT TO
COPYRIGHT’S GOAL OF THE INTELLECTUAL STIMULATION OF THE PUBLIC.

The Court’s initial stress on the secondary use’s market effect is logical when one
considers the balance that copyright law aims to strike. “The utilitarian concept underlying the
copyright promises authors the opportunity to realize rewards in order to encourage them to
create.”174 If authors are granted insufficient protection, creative incentives may be significantly
reduced, thereby harming the benefits the public might receive.175 On the other hand, “[t]he
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more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged.”176
To be sure, some degree of licensing is necessary to maintain adequate creative incentives. But
excessive protection will prevent individuals from using prior developments “as building
blocks for their own technological contributions.”177 Copyright law must delicately balance
these two interests.178
These interests presuppose the purpose of copyright. As stated supra, “[t]he primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but ‘to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.’”179 The inference to be drawn is that an author’s protection is
subservient to the public good.180 Although the Court has limited the fourth factor to those
potential derivative uses the copyright owner demonstrates an interest in exploiting,181
copyright was not designed to ensure a maximum economic reward for authors.182 The fourth
factor must be qualified to ensure that potential markets, and in particular licensing markets,
are limited to those necessary to maintain creative incentives.183 Courts must err on the side of
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caution, and the public good, when resolving ambiguities in market harm, or when such harm
appears de minimis.184 As Justice Breyer noted, “Sony’s standard seeks to protect… the
development of technology.”185
B.

THE MARKET FOR A POTENTIAL DERIVATIVE USE MUST BE SUCH THAT ITS
PROTECTION IS REQUIRED TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE CREATIVE INCENTIVES.

The Campbell Court stated that “[t]he market for potential derivative uses includes only
those that creators of the original work would in general develop or license others to
develop.”186 This statement must be qualified, as an overly broad interpretation would cause
fair use to become defunct.187 Thus, to narrow the scope of potential licensing markets, courts
should address two issues when analyzing a use’s market effect: (1) whether the secondary use
is reasonable and customary;188 and (2) whether expansion into a new licensing market is
necessary to maintain sufficient creative incentives.189
A use that is reasonable and customary should presumptively render a copyright
owner’s expansion into a derivative market unnecessary under the fourth factor to maintain
183
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creative incentives.190 Whether a secondary use is reasonable and customary depends largely on
its historical existence.191 For example, in Texaco, Dr. Chickering’s copying of scientific journal
articles was a reasonable and customary practice, as historically it had been accepted that
researchers may copy pertinent journal articles for their explorations.192 The Texaco court noted,
without affirming, that “it is almost universally accepted that a scholar can make a handwritten
copy of an entire copyrighted article for his own use.”193 Moreover, commonsense dictates, and
most would assume, that it is permissible to copy pages of a book or article, or a part thereof,
for research.
Although new technologies will generally not involve uses that are reasonable and
customary, as novel developments often create novel uses, the reasonable and customary
inquiry is nonetheless helpful. For example, in Perfect 10, the court wholly neglected that
Google’s use was potentially reasonable and customary.194 An analysis of the history of search
engines demonstrates that as early as 1995 it was accepted practice for search engines to provide
a comprehensive image search function.195 Significant dispute did not arise until after the birth
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of the market for cellphone images. As such, one could conclude that Google’s practice of
indexing images has been an accepted use since search engines developed such a capability.
Nonetheless, even a reasonable and customary use may no longer be deemed such if it
sufficiently damages an author’s creative incentives. 196 Thus, one must ask whether the
expansion into the derivative market is necessary to maintain creative incentives.197 The
majority in Texaco entirely failed to address the issue of whether the publishers’ expansion into
the photocopying licensing market was a necessity, ruling that the advent of a new licensing
market automatically renders a prior reasonable and customary use unfair.198 The Texaco
dissent thoroughly addressed the issue, concluding that the copyrights’ holders expansion into
the licensing market for photocopying was unnecessary to maintain creative incentives.199 The
dissent noted that, with regards to scientific journals, a scientist’s incentives for publication are
widespread dissemination, and as such the addition of a licensing market will hinder, rather
than further, this interest.200 Further, the proliferation of journals, particularly through sales and
subscriptions, and the publishers’ control over these distributions, ensured adequate creative
incentives.201 Given these facts, expansion was unnecessary because “so long as the copyright
system assures sufficient revenues to print and distribute scientific journals, the level of copyright
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revenue is not among the incentives that drive the authors to the creative acts that the copyright
laws are intended to foster.”202
The court in Perfect 10, like the Texaco majority, failed to address whether Perfect 10’s
market expansion was necessary, in the face of Google’s search engine’s public benefit, to
maintain sufficient creative incentives. Instead, the court summarily concluded that “Google’s
use of thumbnails likely does harm the potential market for the download of P10’s reduced-size
images onto cell phones.”203 The court assumed, just as the Texaco majority did, that the advent
of a new licensing market renders a use, if once reasonable and customary, unfair.204
Such an analysis wholly neglects copyright’s law mandate to enhance the public welfare.
Perfect 10’s expansion into the cell phone market was not necessary to maintain its creative
incentives to continue its production of pornographic photography. Perfect 10 continued to
profit from its magazine and website subscription sales.205 Moreover, Perfect 10 admitted that
the thumbnail image market was continuing to grow despite Google’s practices.206 Thus, not
only was protection of this market unnecessary to maintain sufficient creative incentives, the
evidenced market growth “actually [demonstrated] the peaceful coexistence of Google search
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results and Perfect 10’s new cellphone business model.”207 Given the public benefit and utility
of Google’s search engine, and the fact that Perfect 10’s market for thumbnail images was
consistently growing, the court in Perfect 10 improperly protected Perfect 10’s expansion into
the thumbnail image cell phone market. In the future, it is crucial that courts do not assume the
advent of a new licensing market renders a secondary use unfair, as this conclusion allows new
licensing markets to overshadow the fair use analysis, and derails the accepted notion that “[a]
use may be fair despite some harm to the potential market if its social value is high.”208
VII.

CONCLUSION
The congressional grant of flexibility in the doctrine of fair use has given courts the

ability to accommodate new technologies, but has provided limited guidance. In the digital era,
with the increasing presence of licensing markets, a secondary use’s potential effect on the
market must not be allowed to overshadow the fair use analysis. Protecting creative incentives
is a valid concern, but when the social value of a use is high, and its impact on the market is not
only de minimis, but unlikely to significantly diminish an author’s inventive inspirations, the use
must be permitted for the public good. After all, “[t]he sole interest of the United States… in
conferring the [copyright] monopoly… lie[s] in the general benefits derived by the public from
the labors of authors,”209 and “[w]hen technological change has rendered the literal terms [of the
Copyright Act] ambiguous, [it] must be construed in light of this basic purpose.”210
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